Reliable deduction
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28443Palabras clave:
Reasoning, inferential knowledge, reliability.Resumen
In this paper I address the question of what makes deduction reliable (when it is reliable). A successful answer to that question would help us understand how deduction can expand and generate knowledge. I explore two answers to the main question. The first one makes use of the notion of formal-logical entailment, whereas the second one makes use of the notion of metaphysical entailment. The latter is found to be superior to the former, in that it allows us to explain the reliability of a wider class of reliable types of deduction.
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