Explaining Rationality with Attributions of Knowledge-How

Luis Rosa

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24271

Autores

Luis Rosa Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24271

Palavras-chave:

Regresso das razões. Racionalidade. Saber-como.

Resumo

Na primeira parte deste estudo, defendemos que a afirmação de que um sujeito S crê que ϕ com base em boas razões não pode ser o único tipo de explicação para o fato de que S racionalmente crê que ϕ. Explicar atribuições de racionalidade somente por meio da noção de uma crença baseada em boas razões gera uma versão do problema do regresso das razões. Na segunda parte, apresentamos uma hipótese de acordo com a qual algumas crenças são racionalmente mantidas por um sujeito S em virtude do fato de que S sabe como produzir boas razões para sustentá-las. Na terceira parte, oferecemos razões para aceitar a hipótese relevante e argumentamos que ela é superior a teorias fundacionistas e coerentistas ao explicar a verdade de algumas atribuições de racionalidade. Na última parte do artigo, tratamos do problema do regresso das razões e esboçamos uma solução para tal problema, a partir de nossa hipótese.

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