Explaining Rationality with Attributions of Knowledge-How
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24271Keywords:
Regress of Reasons. Rationality. Knowledge-How.Abstract
In the first part of this paper, we argue that the claim that a subject S believes that ϕ on the basis of good reasons cannot be the only type of explanation why S rationally believes that ϕ. Explaining attributions of rationality only by means of the notion of a belief being based on good reasons generates one version of the problem of regress of reasons. In the second part we flesh out a hypothesis according to which some beliefs are rationally held by a subject S in virtue of the fact that S knows how to produce good reasons for holding them. In the third part we offer reasons for accepting the relevant hypothesis, and we argue that it is more successful than foundationalist, coherentist and infinitist theories in explaining the truth of some attributions of epistemic rationality. In the last part we address the problem of the regress of reasons and sketch a solution for it based on our hypothesis.
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