Reliable deduction

Luis Rosa

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28443

Autores

Luis Rosa

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28443

Palavras-chave:

Raciocínio, conhecimento inferencial, confiabilidade

Resumo

***Dedução confiável***

Neste artigo trato da questão sobre o que torna uma dedução confiável (quando ela é confiável). Uma resposta satisfatória a tal questão nos ajudaria a entender como dedução pode expandir ou gerar conhecimento. Eu exploro duas respostas a tal questão. A primeira faz uso da noção de acarretamento lógico-formal, enquanto que a segunda faz uso da noção de acarretamento metafísico. A última é superior à primeira, pois nos permite explicar a confiabilidade de uma classe mais ampla de deduções.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Referências

Balcerak Jackson, Magdalena and Balcerak Jackson, Brendan (2013). ‘Reasoning as a source of justification’, Philosophical Studies 164(1): 113-126. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0098-6

Baumann, Peter (2009). ‘Reliabilism: Modal, Probabilistic or Contextualist’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 79(1): 77-89. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000858

Boghossian, Paul (2014). ‘What is inference’, Philosophical Studies 169(1): 1-18. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9903-x

Brown, Jessica (2004). ‘Wright on transmission failure’, Analysis 64(281): 57-67. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.1.57

Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard (1998). ‘The Generality Problem for Reliabilism’, Philosophical Studies 89(1): 1-29. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004243308503

Dasgupta, Shamik (2014). ‘On the Plurality of Grounds’, Philosophers' Imprint, 14: 1–28

Dogramaci, Sinan (2016). ‘Reasoning Without Blinders: A Reply to Valaris’, Mind 125(499): 889-893. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv155

Duc, Ho Ngoc (1997). ‘Reasoning about Rational, but not Logically Omniscient, Agents’, Journal of Logic and Computation 7(5): 633-648. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/7.5.633

Fine, Kit (2002). ‘The Varieties of Necessity’, In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldman, Alvin (1979). ‘What Is Justified Belief?’, in G. S. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1-25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1

Goldman, Alvin (1988). ‘Strong and Weak Justification’, Philosophical Perspectives 2: 51-69. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2214068

Harman, Gilbert (1986). Change in View, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Jago, Mark (2014). The Impossible: An Essay on Hyperintensionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709008.001.0001

Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria (2008). ‘Single premise deduction and risk’, Philosophical Studies 141(2): 157-173. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9157-1

Mares, Edwin (2004). Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511520006

Meyer, John-Jules (2003). ‘Modal Epistemic and Doxastic Logic’, In D. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (eds.) Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2 ed.) Vol. 10, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 1-38. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4524-6_1

Richard, Mark (1997). ‘Propositional attitudes’ in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 197-226.

Rumfitt, Ian (2008). ‘Knowledge by Deduction’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 77: 61-84. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000844

Schechter, Joshua (2010). ‘The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic’, Philosophical Perspectives 24(1): 437-464. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00199.x

Schechter, Joshua (2013). ‘Rational self-doubt and the failure of closure’, Philosophical Studies 163(2): 429-452. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9823-1

Shapiro, Stewart (2005). ‘Logical Consequence, Proof Theory and Model Theory’, in S. Shapiro (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 651-670. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0195148770.003.0021

Valaris, Markos (2016). ‘Supposition and Blindness’, Mind 125(499): 895-901. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv162

Williamson, Timothy (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy, Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Wright, Crispin (2002). ‘Anti-sceptics simple and subtle: Moore and McDowell’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(2): 330-48. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00205.x

Wright, Crispin (2014). ‘Comment on Paul Boghossian, “What is inference”’, Philosophical Studies 169(1): 27-37. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9892-9

Yalcin, Seth (2012). ‘A Counterexample to Modus Tollens’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 41(6): 1001-1024. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9228-4