A Critique of the Argument View:: Why Thought Experiments Are More Than Arguments

Roberto Schmitz Nitsche; Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2026.1.48895

Authors

Roberto Schmitz Nitsche Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8522-289X
Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6011-4788

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2026.1.48895

Keywords:

Thought Experiments, Argument View, Inferential Reasoning, Taking Condition, Justification

Abstract

The Argument View posits that thought experiments are merely arguments in disguise, deriving their epistemic power from logical inference. This paper challenges this view, arguing that it rests on a fundamental category error by mischaracterizing the cognitive activity of thought experimentation. We demonstrate that the process of running a thought experiment is phenomenologically and structurally distinct from executing an inference. Specifically, it fails to satisfy the necessary taking condition – where a thinker must take their premises to support their conclusion – a core feature of genuine, person-level reasoning. This critique is shown to be decisive against the strong Execution Thesis. We then extend our analysis to the weaker Reconstructibility Thesis, arguing that it severs the link between a subject and their justification and makes a fatal concession about the indispensable epistemic role of the narrative itself. We conclude that the Argument View is an untenable model because it conflates the imaginative process of discovery with its potential post-hoc logical validation.

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Author Biographies

Roberto Schmitz Nitsche, Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil.

He holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy (2024) and a Master’s degree in Philosophy (2020) from the Federal University of Santa Maria, as well as a Bachelors degree in Philosophy from the Federal University of Pelotas (2016). He is currently a postdoctoral researcher in Philosoph at the Federal University of Santa Maria and teaches Religious Education in the municipality of Gaspar, Santa Catarina. He is also pursuing two postgraduate specializations: Distance Education in Professional and Technological Education at the Federal Institute of São Paulo (since 2025) and Teaching for Professional and Technological Education at the Federal Institute of Rio Grande do Sul (since 2024). Here is a link for a complete CV: http://lattes.cnpq.br/0823474212738588. His research focuses on Epistemology, especially on thought experiments, which he explored in his Master’s dissertation, and intuitions, which he developed further in his Doctoral thesis.

Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues, Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil.

Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), where he coordinates the CIM Research Group within the Graduate Program in Philosophy. He is also Coordinator of the Graduate Program in Philosophy of the Federal University of Santa Maria. Here is a link for a compelte CV: http://lattes.cnpq.br/4547029422865527. His research focuses on Epistemology, including Sources of Knowledge (Memory), Social Epistemology, and Practical and Epistemic Rationality. He investigates the nature, scope, and justification of knowledge, as well as the social and collective dimensions of knowledge production. He holds a PhD in Philosophy (Epistemology) from PUCRS (2011), during which he completed a visiting research period at Rutgers University, USA (sandwich program, 2009–2010) under the supervision of Peter Klein. He has been a postdoctoral research at Universität zu Köln (2022–2023, CAPES PrInt Fellow) under the supervision of Sven Bernecker, and at PUCRS (2016) under the supervision of Cláudio de Almeida, developing work on memory, social epistemology, and rationality.

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