Against fake news: Rethinking the strategy of news abstinence

Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.45041

Autores

Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6011-4788

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.45041

Palavras-chave:

abstinência de notícias, notícias falsas, ignorância, suspensão de juízo, informação

Resumo

Em seu artigo “Uma defesa epistêmica da abstinência de notícias” (2021), Sven Bernecker defende uma abordagem epistêmica radical para combater o consumo de notícias falsas. Ele sugere que um sujeito pode ser propositalmente justificado ao ignorar as notícias em circunstâncias específicas. Este artigo examina criticamente a tese proposta por Bernecker e levanta questões importantes que minam a sua plausibilidade. Em seguida, uma revisão da teoria da abstinência de notícias é proposta. Argumenta-se que a atitude original de ignorar as notícias é epistemicamente inadequada e deveria ser substituída pela atitude mais adequada de suspender o juízo. Esse ajuste permite manter a ideia original de Bernecker de uma estratégia epistêmica de defesa contra o consumo de notícias falsas e, ao mesmo tempo, evitar os problemas que lhe estão associados.

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Biografia do Autor

Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues, Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil.

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