Against fake news: Rethinking the strategy of news abstinence

Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.45041

Autores/as

Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues Universidad Federal de Santa María (UFSM), Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6011-4788

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.45041

Palabras clave:

abstinencia noticiosa, noticias falsas, ignorancia, suspensión de la sentencia, información

Resumen

En su “Defensa epistémica de la abstinencia de noticias” (2021), Sven Bernecker propone un enfoque epistémico radical para combatir el consumo de noticias falsas. Sostiene que, en determinadas circunstancias, un individuo puede estar justificado para ignorar las noticias. Este artículo examina críticamente la propuesta de Bernecker y plantea importantes objeciones que socavan su plausibilidad. A continuación, se propone una revisión de la propuesta de abstinencia informativa. Se argumenta que la actitud inicial de ignorar las noticias es epistémicamente inadecuada y debería ser reemplazada por la actitud más adecuada de suspender el juicio. Este ajuste permite mantener la idea original de Bernecker de una estrategia epistémica de defensa contra el consumo de noticias falsas y, al mismo tempo, evitar los problemas asociados.

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Biografía del autor/a

Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues, Universidad Federal de Santa María (UFSM), Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil.

Citas

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