Internalismo e justificação epistêmica não inferencial
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.20224Keywords:
Internalist Foundationalism. Noninferential Justification. Acquaintance. Phenomenal Conservatism. Seemings.Abstract
In this paper our focus will be on the hard epistemological task internalist versions of foundationalism have, considering the internalist conditions for justification (particularly the requirement of cognitive access to the factors that contribute to doxastic justification), when they try to explain how basic beliefs can be noninferentially justified based on experiences. Recently Michael Huemer has proposed an account of foundational justification, the Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), which he claims is the most successful among the internalist theories of justification. By comparing and contrasting his position with acquaintance theories of noninferential justification, we will try to expose (PC)’s fragilities and suggest that its only way out would be to assume that ultimately the beliefs’ basis is an acquaintance relation, because behind the seemings there is an acquaintance. But doing so (PC) is no longer different from an acquaintance theory.
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