Infinitism and Inferential Externalism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24286Palabras clave:
Infinitism. Externalism. Internalism. Epistemic Justification. Skepticism.Resumen
The purpose of this essay is to show that the version of epistemological infinitism defended by Peter Klein is externalistic in character. I present the most important questions infinitism is supposed to resolve and also present the fundamental difference regarding internalism and externalism in epistemology. I conclude with an indication of what would be the best way to understand infinitism and how to evade the problems that emerge from Klein’s externalist infinitism.
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