Epistemology of Religion:

On the Rationality and Defeasibility of Religious Belief

Abstract

This article examines the conditions under which religious belief may be regarded as rational in light of contemporary debates in epistemology. Beginning with the distinction between belief and knowledge, it examines the role of epistemic justification as the element that confers stability and epistemic value upon beliefs, preventing their truth from being merely a matter of luck or chance. It then explores the notion of epistemic rationality, focusing on the debate between internalism and externalism and their implications for the assessment of religious belief, as illustrated by the evidentialist and externalist approaches advanced by Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga, respectively. The article then introduces the notion of epistemic defeasibility, emphasizing that the rationality of a belief depends not only on the presence of justifiers but also on its ability to withstand potential defeaters. It examines several prominent challenges to religious belief—including the problem of evil, divine hiddenness, and naturalistic critiques of religion—and considers possible responses to them. It argues that the existence of such defeaters does not automatically render religious belief irrational, since they may themselves be neutralized by appropriate counterarguments (that is, defeater defeaters). The article concludes that the rationality of religious belief should be understood more broadly, as depending both on the conditions under which the belief is formed and sustained and on its capacity to withstand defeaters.