Moderate holism

Abstract

This article defends a moderate version of meaning holism, based on Henry Jackman’s proposal. After distinguishing atomism, molecularism, and holism as fundamental positions on meaning, the paper outlines the origins and major criticisms of radical holism—particularly the arguments advanced by Fodor and Lepore against the instability thesis. It then examines three contemporary models that reformulate holism while avoiding its most problematic commitments: Ted Warfield’s notion of inferential supervenience; Peter Pagin’s reconciliation of holism and compositionality; and Jackman’s development of a robust metasemantic contextualism. The central claim is that linguistic meanings depend on conceptual and contextual networks, without requiring unrestricted interdependence among all elements of language. Jackman’s model stands out by introducing the relative weight of beliefs, the principle of charity, and the expectation of interpretive convergence, offering an account of how semantic stability is maintained despite contextual variability. The article presents formal tools that model meaning as a function of context and beliefs, and as a weighted set of relevant inferences. These analytical frameworks are applied to linguistic phenomena, revealing the explanatory strength of the proposal. By articulating meaning, context, and discursive practices, moderate semantic holism emerges as a solid and refined theoretical alternative for understanding the semantic dynamics of natural languages.