Emotional appraisal as the perception of affordances

Rafael Graebin Vogelmann

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2025.1.44472

Authors

Rafael Graebin Vogelmann Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9582-8465

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2025.1.44472

Keywords:

Emotional Appraisal, Emotions, Affordances, Perception

Abstract

Appraisal is a central concept in cognitive approaches in affective science. According to Appraisal Theory, emotions are elicited and differentiated on the basis of the appraisal of the personal significance of a situation, object, or event one is faced with. This paper addresses the question of what exactly are emotional appraisals. I discuss and reject the claim that appraisals are evaluative judgments and the claim that appraisals are embodied appraisals. Both views ascribe representational content to emotions. I argue instead that we should take appraisals to be perceptions of relevant affordances. This view can account for the observations that favor cognitive conceptions of emotions (such as the fact that emotions are intentional, value-laden states that can be rationally assessed) while avoiding the problems faced by views that ascribe representational
content to emotions.

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Author Biography

Rafael Graebin Vogelmann, Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil.

Professor in the Department of Philosophy at UFSM and Permanent Professor of the Graduate Program in Philosophy (PPGF). PhD in Philosophy from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) (2021), with a period as visiting graduate student at the University of California - Los Angeles (UCLA) (2019-2020). His interests lie primarily in metaethics, philosophy of action, and moral psychology.

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