Normative authority and the demands of morality

an analysis of Denis Coitinho’s hybrid theory

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.44382

Keywords:

hybrid moral theory, normative authority, public morality, private morality.

Abstract

The paper aims to evaluate the strength of the thesis defended by Denis Coitinho that public morality and private morality have normatively distinct natures. Recently, Coitinho (2021) argued that monist theories cannot explain the complexity of morality because they do not consider the normative duality of ethics. By treating moral reasoning as an all-or-nothing matter, they ignore that public morality’s normative authority is intersubjective and private morality’s
normative authority is subjective. Despite the attractiveness of Coitinho’s proposal, I discuss four points that deserve a more detailed investigation. First, the normative authority of the private sphere excludes the possibility of directing a
rational critique to the set of desires and interests of an agent. Then, I show that taking Dworkin’s work on integrity as an example can be problematic considering the purposes of Coitinho’s project. Integrity is better seen as an epistemic virtue than a private one. Finally, I explore scenarios in which the thesis of the superiority of public over private normativity leads to counterintuitive consequences.

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Author Biography

Lucas Mateus Dalsotto, Universidade de Caxias do Sul (UCS), Caxias do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil.

PhD in Philosophy from the Federal University of Santa Maria and PhD candidate in Law from the Federal University of Minas Gerais. Permanent professor of the PPG in Philosophy at UCS.

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Published

2024-08-28

How to Cite

Dalsotto, L. M. (2024). Normative authority and the demands of morality: an analysis of Denis Coitinho’s hybrid theory . Veritas (Porto Alegre), 69(1), e44382. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.44382

Issue

Section

Ethics and Political Philosophy