Nietzsche and Prinz
A compatibilist hypothesis of cognitive and non-cognitive approaches in the philosophy of emotions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2023.1.43798Keywords:
emotion, feeling, evaluation, disposition, Nietzsche, PrinzAbstract
The purpose of the text is not only to explain the contribution of Nietzsche’s philosophy to the current debate around the philosophy of emotions, through a theoretical approach to Jesse Prinz’s emotionism – especially the approach of emotions understood as feeling –, but above all to defend the thesis of the compatibility of the cognitive and non-cognitive approach to emotions. Thus, if on the one hand, emotions are accompanied by somatic signals, on the other hand, emotions also represent concerns (Prinz) or evaluations (Nietzsche) about something in the world. The compatibilist thesis helps in solving two serious objections to sentimentalism: the determination of the content of emotions and the individualization of emotional experiences. Maybe this thesis is best understood, furthermore, through the dispositional hypothesis.
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