Mental or Neural Representations: Justifying the terminology used in cognitive neuroscience

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2020.2.35387

Keywords:

neural representation, mental representation, cognitive neuroscience, Wittgenstein

Abstract

In this paper we investigate whether one of the most common uses of the concept of representation is justifiable by suggesting the conditions under which it can be accepted and how it can be related to mental states. We present mental states in terms of private experiences and public events. We argue that a representation is a relation involving three main elements as well as the user of the representation, and defend that the conditions in which we can conceive neural activity as representational are set by the context of observing a correlation between public events and patterns of neural activity. We aim at demonstrating that neural activity can be seen as both representational and non-representational - but rather constitutive - depending upon if we are considering public events under the perspective of the observer, or if we are considering private experiences under the subjective perspective.

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Author Biographies

Fabiana Mesquita Carvalho, Universidade de São Paulo (USP), São Paulo.

Post-Doctoral Researcher — University of Sao Paulo — FFLCH, USP.

Nara M. Figueiredo, Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), Campinas, SP.

Post-Doctoral Researcher - University of Campinas. UNICAMP. This is my current affiliation. This work was developed while Dr. Fabiana and I were both researchers in the philosophy department of the University of São Paulo - USP, under the supervision of Prof. Osvaldo Pessoa. We would like to thank the department and the fundamental support of Prof. Osvaldo.

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Published

2020-07-15

How to Cite

Carvalho, F. M., & Figueiredo, N. M. (2020). Mental or Neural Representations: Justifying the terminology used in cognitive neuroscience. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 65(2), e35387. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2020.2.35387

Issue

Vol. 65 No. 2 (2020)

Section

Varia

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