On the nature of inference in Boghossian
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2019.3.34644Keywords:
Inference. Agency. Belief. Rational Causation. Boghossian.Abstract
If believing based on reasons is something that apparently involves steps and takes time what prevents us from considering inferential judgment or reasoning in general as an activity, the product of a special kind of agency? The idea that there is genuine activity when we make an inference is implicit in many authors. In this paper I analyze an explicit defense of this conception: the thesis developed by Paul Boghossian that inference is a form of cognitive action. I argue that there is a contrast in the structure of reasons and causation between believing for reasons and acting for reasons. And I conclude that what seems to be active in the specific case of reasoning which is to make an inference is due to its conceptual connection with the state of belief. When we believe that p based on q, we believe for a reason given to us by another belief.
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