O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?

Autores

  • Doraci Engel Pontíficia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28442

Palavras-chave:

Agência, Racionalidade Epistêmica, Racionalidade Prática, Conhecimento.

Resumo

Neste artigo examino a possibilidade de agência no domínio epistêmico – a visão compartilhada por muitos filósofos de que possamos ser ativos, ao invés de passivos, em relação às nossas crenças e manifestações de conhecimento. Concluo que a noção de agência epistêmica é plausível apenas em sentido indireto, referindo-se as diferentes ações que realizamos com intuito de melhorar nossos compromissos epistêmicos. Trata-se de um tipo de agência prática, como qualquer agência, mas que não nos autoriza a pensar que possamos estar agindo de alguma maneira quando cremos ou conhecemos.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Biografia do Autor

Doraci Engel, Pontíficia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul

Possui graduação em jornalismo pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina - UFSC (1983), graduação em Filosofia pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul - PUCRS (2010), mestrado em Filosofia pela Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul - PUCRS (2012) e doutorado pela Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul - PUCRS (2017). Pesquisa nas áreas de Epistemologia e Metafisica.

Referências

ALSTON, W. The reliability of sense perception. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.

ANSCOMBE, G. E .M. Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957.

AUDI, R. ‘Acting for Reasons,’ Philosophical Review, 95(4), p. 511–46, 1986. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2185049

BRATMAN, M. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.

BROOME, J. Rationality through reasoning. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2013. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118609088

BROWN, J. ‘Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.” Nous, 42, p. 167-89, 2008. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x

CHISHOLM, R. ‘Human Freedom and the Self,’ The Lindley Lectures, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas; reprinted in Free Will, 2nd edition, G. WATSON (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 26–37, 1964.

CLIFFORD, W. K. ‘The ethics of belief,’ in T. Madigan, (ed.), The ethics of belief and other essays, Amherst, MA: Prometheus, 70–961877 [1999].

DAVIDSON, D. ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes,’ reprinted in Davidson 1980, p. 3–20, 1963. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.003.0001

____. ‘Mental Events,’ in L. FOSTER and W. SWANSON (eds.) Experience and Theory. Humanities Press, p. 79-101, 1970.

____. ‘Freedom to Act,’ reprinted in Davidson 1980, p. 63–81, 1973.

____. Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.

ENGEL, P. ‘Is Epistemic Agency Possible?,’ Philosophical Issues, 23, p. 157-178, 2013. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12008

FELDMAN, R. ‘The Ethics of Belief’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LX, p. 667-695, 2000. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2653823

FOLEY, R. ‘Evidence and reasons for belief,’ Analysis, 51, p. 98-102, 1991. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/51.2.98

_____ Working Without a Net. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

GINET, C. On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

GOLDMAN, A. A Theory of Human Action. Princeton University Press, 1970.

HAWTHORNE, J. and STANLEY, J. ‘Knowledge and action,’ The Journal of Philosophy, 105, p. 571–90, 2008. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20081051022

HETHERINGTON, S. How To Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118083178

____.‘Skeptical Challenges and Knowing Actions,’ Philosophical Issues, 23, Epistemic Agency, p. 18-39, 2013. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12002

HOOKWAY, C. ‘Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Virtue’, in A.

FAIRWEATHER and L. ZAGZEBSKI (eds.) Virtue Epismology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press, p. 178:99, 2001.

HYMAN, J. ‘How Knowledge works,’ The philosophical Quarterly, 49 (19), p. 433-451, 1999. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00152

JAMES, W. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, New York: Longmans, Green, and Co, p. 1–25, 1896 (2012). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/11061-001

KAVKA, G. ‘The Toxin Puzzle,’ Analysis, 43, p. 33–6, 1983. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/43.1.33

LITTLEJOHN, C. ‘The Unity of Reason,’ in C. LITTLEJOHN and J. TURRI (eds.) Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press, p. 135-54, 2014. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.003.0008

LOWE, E. J. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

LYNCH, M. ‘Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical Reasons,’ Philosophical Issues, 23, p. 343-62, 2013. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12018

MELDEN, A. I. Free Action, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.

MELE, A. Motivation and Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/019515617X.001.0001

NAGEL, J. ‘Knowledge as a Mental State’, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 4, p. 275-310, 2013. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.003.0010

O’BRIEN, L. Self-Knowing Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001

PARFIT, D. On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford Universisty Press, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572809.001.0001

PERCIVAL, P. ‘Epistemic Consequentialism,’ The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 76 (1), p. 121-151, 2002. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00092

RYLE, G. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson, 1949.

SCANLON, T. What we owe to each other, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1998

SCHLOSSER, M. E. ‘Agency,’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/, 2015.

SCHROEDER, M., ‘The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons,’ Ethics, 122( 3), p. 457–488, 2012. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/664753

SEHON, S. Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.

SETIYA, K. ‘Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts,’ Philosophical Issues, 23 (1), p. 179-198, 2013. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12009

SIDGWICK, H. The Methods of Ethics. London: MacMillan, 1874.

SOSA, E. ‘Knowing Full Well. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.003.0001

STANLEY, J. and WILLIAMSON, T. ‘Knowing how.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 98, p. 411–44, 2001. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2678403

SUIKKANEN, J. ‘Introduction”, in J. SUIKKANEN and J. COTTINGHAM (eds.) Essays on Derek Parfit’s On What Matters, Willey-Balckwell, p. 1-20, 2009. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444322880.ch1

TAYLOR, R. Action and Purpose, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

VELLEMAN, D. ‘What Happens when Someone Acts?,’ Mind, 101, p. 461–481, 1992. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/101.403.461

____. The possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.

WILLIAMSON, T. Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

____. ‘Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and Knowledge of Knowledge,’ Philosophical Quarterly. 55, p. 213: 35, 2005. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00396.x

Downloads

Publicado

2017-12-28

Como Citar

Engel, D. (2017). O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 62(3), 540–565. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28442