The myth of knowledge

Authors

  • Laurence BonJour Universidade de Washington
  • Albertinho Luiz Gallina Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
  • Kariane Marques da Silva Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2016.3.22018

Keywords:

Knowledge. Fallibilism. Cartesianism.

Abstract

In “The Myth of Knowledge” Laurence Bonjour defends the thesis that the “fallibilist” conception of knowledge, assumed by most epistemologists in the post-Gettier era, “is wrong” – such a “weak” concept of knowledge provides little philosophical satisfaction, and is non-existent in common sense, thus constituting only a “philosophical myth”.

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Author Biography

Albertinho Luiz Gallina, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria

Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas

Departamento de Filosofia

Epistemologia e Metaética

References

BONJOUR, Laurence. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.

BUTCHAROV, Panayot. The Concept of Knowledge. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

CHISHOLM, Roderick. Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

______ . Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

______ . Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989.

DEROSE, Keith. Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74 (1996), p. 568-580. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409612347531

FUMERTON, Richard. Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

GETTIER, Edmund. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis, 23 (1963), p. 121-123. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/23.6.121

HAWTHORNE, John. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199269556.001.0001

MALCOLM, Norman. Knowledge and Belief. In: MALCOLM, Norman. Knowledge and Certainty. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963. p. 58-72. (Reimpressão de “Mind”, 61, 242 [1952], p. 178-189.)

MOORE, G. E. Proof of an External World. In: MOORE, G. E. Philosophical Papers. Londres: Allen & Unwin, 1959. p. 127-150. (Reimpressão do Proceedings of the British Academy, 25, 5 [1939], p. 273-300.)

NELKIN, Dana. The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality. Philosophical Review, 109 (2000), p. 373-409. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2693695

VOGEL, Jonathan. Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle? In: ROTH, M.; ROSS, G. (eds.). Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990. p. 13-28. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1942-6_2

WILLIAMSOM, Timothy. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

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Published

2017-01-05

How to Cite

BonJour, L., Gallina, A. L., & da Silva, K. M. (2017). The myth of knowledge. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 61(3), 503–534. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2016.3.22018

Issue

Vol. 61 No. 3 (2016): Epistemology, Language and Metaphysics

Section

Epistemology, Phenomenology and Metaphysics

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