Infinitism and Inferential Externalism

Tito Flores

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24286

Autores

Tito Flores Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, PUCRS

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24286

Palavras-chave:

Infinitismo. Externalismo. Internalismo. Justificação epistêmica. Ceticismo.

Resumo

O propósito deste ensaio é mostrar que a versão de infinitismo epistemológico defendida por Peter Klein é uma forma de externalismo. São apresentados os problemas mais importantes que o infinitismo deve resolver e também a diferença fundamental entre internalismo e externalismo em epistemologia. Como conclusão, é apresentada uma indicação sobre a melhor maneira de entender o infinitismo e como superar os problemas que surgem da forma externalista de infinitismo defendida por Klein.

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