Restrictions on the hypothesis of mutual knowledge in the communicative process
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1980-3729.1995.3.2928Keywords:
Communication, Communicative Process, Relevance TheoryAbstract
The purpose of this article is to highlight one of these controversial issues, specifically the one that refers to the rejection by S-W of the hypotheses of mutual knowledge (MK), which is replaced by the notion of mutually manifest cognitive environments. This notion is a fundamental presupposition of theory and hence of the principle of relevance (PR), and will be discussed on the basis of arguments that make it possible to clarify the true purpose of the authors.Downloads
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