The Virtue of Knowing-How
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https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24270Palabras clave:
Virtue Epistemology. Knowledge-How. Epistemic Luck. Propositional Knowledge.Resumen
Intellectualists about knowledge-how state that knowledgehow is a kind of propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists try to show that there are cases where the agent has knowledge-how without knowing-that. This paper focuses on recent anti-intellectualists’ arguments by Carter and Pritchard. I argue that Carter and Pritchard’s arguments are not well succeeded and that, if we apply virtue epistemology to this debate, we can conclude that knowledge-how shares the same epistemic properties as propositional knowledge. If this is correct, we can say that knowledge-how is a kind of propositional knowledge and intellectualism is safe again.
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