The Virtue of Knowing-How

Authors

  • Felipe Rocha L. Santos Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24270

Keywords:

Virtue Epistemology. Knowledge-How. Epistemic Luck. Propositional Knowledge.

Abstract

Intellectualists about knowledge-how state that knowledgehow is a kind of propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists try to show that there are cases where the agent has knowledge-how without knowing-that. This paper focuses on recent anti-intellectualists’ arguments by Carter and Pritchard. I argue that Carter and Pritchard’s arguments are not well succeeded and that, if we apply virtue epistemology to this debate, we can conclude that knowledge-how shares the same epistemic properties as propositional knowledge. If this is correct, we can say that knowledge-how is a kind of propositional knowledge and intellectualism is safe again.

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References

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Published

2016-06-10

How to Cite

L. Santos, F. R. (2016). The Virtue of Knowing-How. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 60(3), 483–499. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24270

Issue

Vol. 60 No. 3 (2015): Debating Contemporary Epistemology

Section

Debating Contemporary Epistemology

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