Epistemic levels, the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Skepticism

Authors

  • Tito Flores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2009.2.6820

Keywords:

Skepticism. Problem of the Criterion. Closure Principle. Problem of Easy Knowledge. Epistemic Level Confusion.

Abstract

The Problem of Easy Knowledge has recently been defined as arising in two different forms: one connected with some version of the epistemic closure principle and the other with bootstrapping. This essay shows that these supposed two forms actually generate two quite different problems. One of them is related with the supposed easy (unacceptable) acquisition of first-order knowledge, and the other with the supposed easy (unacceptable) acquisition of second-order knowledge, each of them requiring different solutions. It is also presented how Infinitism, the view that the structure of justificatory reasons is infinite and non-repeating, can deal with these two different challenges.

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Published

2009-08-30

How to Cite

Flores, T. (2009). Epistemic levels, the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Skepticism. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 54(2). https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2009.2.6820

Issue

Vol. 54 No. 2 (2009): Analytic epistemology

Section

Articles

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