Moore against the sceptics
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41521Keywords:
Burdens of proof, Debates, G. E. Moore, Knowledge, ScepticismAbstract
Moore’s “Proof of an external world” and his “Four forms of scepticism” have long puzzled commentators. How are these adequate responses to sceptics? How, for that matter, is the so-called proof of an external world even pertinent to the challenge of scepticism? The notion of relativized burdens of proof is introduced: this is a burden of proof vis-à-vis one’s opponent that one takes on when trying to convince that someone of something. The relativized burden of proof is a making explicit (in the topic of rational discourse) the truism that if you argue with someone with the intent of trying to convince that someone of something, and if you fail to, you have not met your own conversational goal. Assuming Moore is implicitly relying on the notion of relativized burdens of proof illuminates his approach in these papers.
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