A quasi-objectivity in David Hume’s theory of values
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.40224Keywords:
David Hume, Moral value, Aesthetic value, Cognitivism, Non cognitivismAbstract
The aim of this paper is to answer to the question of whether, in Hume’s philosophy, the standard to establish the truth value of pronouncements about moral and aesthetic values can be considered as genuinely objective. To achieve this aim, firstly, I clarify three positions one can hold about the question of whether this standard is or is not genuinely objective, namely, subjectivism, intersubjectivism and objectivism (I and II). Then, I explain the prominence of the cognitivist interpretation and why the realist interpretation proposed by David Norton fails (III). Finally, and in the light of a distinction between objectivity in a strong and in a weak sense (or quasi-objectivity), I conclude that in Hume’s philosophy, the standard for pronouncements about values is quasi-objective (IV).
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