Epistemic dependence, testimony, and gettierization
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https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2019.3.34636Keywords:
Epistemic Dependence. Testimony. Gettierization. Sandy Goldberg. Gilbert Harman.Abstract
The aim of this essay is to examine Sandy Goldberg’s proposal, according to which there is some division of epistemic labor in certain processes of knowledge acquisition – at least in the acquisition of testimonial knowledge. Goldberg intends to show why this is true by highlighting our epistemic dependence on other people, or even on entire communities. With Goldberg’s proposal in mind, we will try to handle a famous Gettiertype case which, according to Gilbert Harman, unveils some social aspects of knowledge. Lastly, we hope to take some lessons from Goldberg’s proposal, among which the most important is that, if there is in fact division of epistemic labor in processes of knowledge acquisition, then in many situations the subject’s epistemic properties are not the only decisive factors relevant to verify whether or not she has knowledge, thus showing that knowledge is more social than individual when it comes to a vast range of cases.
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