Relevance and goal conciliation: logical adequacy and empirical plausibility

Abstract

Wilson (2004) designs an example to explain the notion of cognitive effects employing three assumptions as initial cognitive context: (1) “I’ll (probably) catch the bus” (2) “If I catch the bus, I’ll get to the lecture” and (3) “If I don’t catch the bus, I’ll miss the lecture” and two possible achievements: case A, the individual catches the bus and gets to the lecture, and case B, the individual does not catch the bus and misses the lecture. In the example, Wilson (2004) has to preview at least two opposite options in the initial cognitive context to use only modus ponens as an elimination rule, suggesting that this arrangement is necessary in all uses of conditionals. In this article we argue that the biconditional architecture can be applied to the example, decreasing the initial processing cost and keeping the logical adequacy. We also argue that a goal conciliation architecture can explain not only cases where options like yes/no can be anticipated, but also situations where options like yes/no-alternatives are viable, increasing the empirical plausibility of the analysis.