The fabric of justice: Limits of proceduralism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-7289.2009.3.6896Keywords:
Reconhecimento, Teoria da justiça, Procedimentalismo, Filosofia políticaAbstract
The lecture tries, in a first step, to show that the intrinsic fabric of justice doesn`t consist of distributable goods, but of commonly accepted social relations which are composed of morally loaded practices; in these practices those regards can be found which define what it means to treat another person in a fair or just manner. If this starting point is convincing, then some methodological consequences concerning the concept of justice have to be drawn which are presented in the second step: Instead of constructing a normative procedure which allows us to deduce the content of justice, we have to start by reconstructing the social practices which inform us about the respects of justice. The result will be, as indicated in a third step, a pluralization of our concept of justice which includes as many relevant principles of justice as there are commonly accepted and appreciated forms of social relations.Downloads
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Published
2009-12-20
How to Cite
Honneth, A. (2009). The fabric of justice: Limits of proceduralism. Civitas: Journal of Social Sciences, 9(3), 345–368. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-7289.2009.3.6896
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