Vícios intelectuais e as redes sociais: o acesso constante à informação nos torna intelectualmente viciosos?

Felipe Rocha L. Santos

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28299

Autores

Felipe Rocha L. Santos Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28299

Palavras-chave:

Epistemologia Social, Epistemologia dos Vícios, Epistemologia das Virtudes, Testemunho, Vícios Intelectuais

Resumo

Muitos chamam a era em que atualmente vivemos como a Era da Informação. Isso porque vivemos em um mundo altamente conectado onde o fluxo de informação é constante. Uma das principais fontes de informação nos dias de hoje é a Internet, seja através de pesquisas no Google, seja através do testemunho de nossos amigos ou empresas em que confiamos, através das redes sociais. Este artigo visa realizar uma análise desde um ponto de vista da epistemologia social e de uma epistemologia dos vícios para se responder uma pergunta que vem sendo feita em diversas pesquisas de psicologia experimental: O uso da Internet nos torna intelectualmente viciosos? A conclusão a que chego é a de que sim, em determinados contextos, o uso da Internet nos torna intelectualmente viciosos. Para chegar a esta conclusão, analiso um experimento realizado em uma pesquisa de psicologia experimental que afirma que a Internet nos torna intelectualmente arrogantes e uma resposta desde um ponto de vista da epistemologia que defende que este uso pode promover talvez mais virtudes. Em seguida considero a arquitetura da internet dentro de um contexto informacional específico para poder chegar à conclusão de que a internet, em determinados contextos, nos torna sim intelectualmente viciosos.

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