John Rawls Refutou o Intuicionismo?

Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.45448

Authors

Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion State University of Londrina, Londrina, Paraná, Brazil. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4260-1771

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.45448

Keywords:

promises, intuitionism, principle of fairness, John Rawls

Abstract

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls explained intuitionism as the doctrine that professes the irreducible pluralism of moral principles—principles whose conflicts cannot be resolved in a principled way. According to Rawls, one cannot offer an abstract argument that proves moral pluralism false. However, it is possible to demonstrate what the intuitionist denies exists: the most fundamental moral principle that systematizes our moral obligations. Rawls identifies this principle as the principle of fairness. In this article, I argue that Rawls falls short in addressing intuitionists. My arguments rely on an analysis of the applicability of the principle of fairness to the case of promises. First, I contend that the principle of fairness could only explain moral obligations in general if it could incorporate within its formula a paradigmatic case of the obligations it aims to explain—specifically, promissory obligations. Subsequently, I attempt to show that these promissory obligations possess an essential trait that the principle of fairness would not be able to explain, even if it could account for moral obligations in general: the distinctive nature of the obligations as special obligations to the promisees. In the first point, my research expands on Robert Nozick's criticisms of a version of the principle of fairness presented by H.L.A. Hart. In the second, I develop objections made by Stephen Darwall against the practical theory of promises, including John Rawls's theory.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion, State University of Londrina, Londrina, Paraná, Brazil.

PhD in philosophy from the State University of Campinas. Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the State University of Londrina. CNPq Productivity Scholarship.

References

ANSCOMBE, G. E. M. Rules, Rights, and Promises. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Barcelona, v. 3, p. 318–323, 1978. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1978.tb00364.x

DARWALL, S. Demystifying Promises. In: SHEINMAN, H. (Ed.). Promises and Agreements: Philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 255–276, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.003.0011

DOWNIE, R. S. Three Accounts of Promising. The Philosophical Quarterly, Oxford, v. 35, n. 140, p. 259, jul. 1985. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2218905

GILBERT, M. Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees’ Rights. The Journal of Philosophy, New York, v. 101, n. 2, p. 83–109, fev. 2004. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil200410126

GILBERT, M. Three Dogmas about Promising. In: SHEINMAN, H. (Ed.). Promises and Agreements: Philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 80–108, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.003.0003

HART, H. L. A. Are There Any Natural Rights? The Philosophical Review, Durham, v. 64, n. 2, p. 175–191, abr. 1955. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2182586

HOOKER, B. Ideal Code, Real World: a rule-consequentialist theory of morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

HOOKER, B. Promises and Rule-Consequentialism. In: SHEINMAN, Hanoch (ed.). Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 237–254, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.003.0010

HUME, D. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888.

KOLODNY, N.; WALLACE, R. J. Promises and Practices Revisited. Philosophy and Public Affairs, New Jersey, v. 31, n. 2, p. 119–154, abr. 2003. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2003.00119.x

MACCORMICK, N.; RAZ, J. Voluntary Obligations, and Normative Powers. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Oxford, v. 46, p. 59–102, 1972. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/46.1.59

MASON, E. We Make No Promises. Philosophical Studies, Groningen, v. 123, n. 1–2, p. 33–46, mar. 2005. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5219-9

MCNEILLY, F. S. Promises De-Moralized. The Philosophical Review, Durham, v. 81, n. 1, p. 63–81, jan. 1972. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2184226

NORCROSS, A. Act-utilitarianism and Promissory Obligation. In: SHEINMAN, H. (Ed.). Promises and Agreements: philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 217–236, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.003.0009

NOZICK, R. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.

OWENS, D. A Simple Theory of Promising. The Philosophical Review, Durham, v. 115, n. 1, p. 51–77, 1 jan. 2006. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-115-1-51

OWENS, D. Duress, Deception, and the Validity of a Promise. Mind, London, v. 116, n. 462, p. 293–315, 2007. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm293

OWENS, D. Rationalism about Obligation. European Journal of Philosophy, New York, v. 16, n. 3, p. 403–431, dez. 2008. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00327.x

OWENS, D. The Problem with Promising. In: SHEINMAN, H. (Ed.). Promises and Agreements: philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 58–79, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.003.0002

PRICHARD, H. A. The Obligation to Keep a Promise. In: MACADAM, J. (Ed.). Moral Writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 257–265, 2002. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199250197.003.0012

RAWLS, J. Two Concepts of Rules. The Philosophical Review, Durham, v. 64, n. 1, p. 3–32, jan. 1955. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2182230

RAWLS, J. Uma Teoria da Justiça. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1997.

RAWLS, J. A Theory of Justice (Revised edition). Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674042582

RAZ, J. Promises and Obligations. In: HACKER, P. M. S.; RAZ, J. (Eds.). Law, Morality, and Society: essays in honor of H.L.A. Hart. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 210–228, 1977.

RAZ, J. Promises in Morality and Law—Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, v. 95, p. 916–938, 1982. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1340782

RAZ, J. Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise? In: KLASS, G.; LETSAS, G.; SAPRAI, P. (Eds.). Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 58-77, 2014. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713012.003.0004

RAZ, J. Normative Powers. In: HEUER, U. (ed.). The Roots of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 162–178, 2022. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192847003.003.0008

REGAN, D. H. Law’s Halo. Social Philosophy and Policy, Cambridge, v. 4, n. 1, p. 15–30, 1986. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500000418

SCANLON, T. Promises and Practices. Philosophy & Public Affairs, New Jersey, v. 19, n. 3, p. 199–226, 1990.

SCANLON, T. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998.

SEARLE, J. R. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198238904.003.0013

SHIFFRIN, S. V. Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism. The Philosophical Review, Durham, v. 117, n. 4, p. 481–524, 1 out. 2008. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-014

SIDGWICK, H. The Methods of Ethics. 7. ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 1962. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81786-3

THOMSON, J. J. The Realm of Rights. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1990.

TOGNAZZINI, N. A. The Hybrid Nature of Promissory Obligation. Philosophy & Public Affairs, New Jersey, v. 35, n. 3, p. 203–232, jun. 2007. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2007.00108.x

WATSON, G. Promises, Reasons, and Normative Powers. In: SOBEL, D.; WALL, S. (Eds.). Reasons for Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 155–178, 2009. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511720185.008