Substance, Inherence and Bradley’s regress

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.44912

Keywords:

substance, inherence, modes, Bradley’s regress, internal relations

Abstract

The article argues that an ontological theory that posits substances and modes of substances as fundamental entities can address the problem of predication without being subject to infinite regressions, particularly Bradley’s regress. This task is accomplished through a strategy to block this regression, the strategy of internal relation – which takes inherence, the relation between substances and modes, as an internal relation, as opposed to so-called “external relations.” The strategy is criticized for circularity, but the text shows it is not viciously circular.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Rodrigo Alexandre de Figueiredo, Dom Luciano Mendes College, Mariana, MG, Brazil.

He holds a degree in Philosophy from the Federal University of Ouro Preto (2009), a Master's degree in Philosophy (Logic and Metaphysics) from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (2012) and a PhD in Philosophy (Logic and Metaphysics) from the same university (2017). He is currently a professor at Dom Luciano Mendes College. He has experience in the area of ​​analytical metaphysics, with an emphasis on ontology, working mainly on the following themes: properties, universals, particulars and ontological categories. He was a CAPES scholarship holder in the Sandwich Doctorate Program Abroad (PDSE).

References

ARMSTRONG, D.M. Nominalism and Realism: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

BRADLEY, F.H. Appearance and Reality. 2nd ed. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Ltd., 1897.

DESCARTES, R. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818998

DEVITT, M. ‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, v. 61, 1980, p. 433–439. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1980.tb00031.x

HOFFMAN, J. e ROSENKRANZ, G. S. Substance Among Other Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527425

IMAGUIRE, G. Priority Nominalism: Grounding Ostrich Nominalism as a Solution to the Problem of Universals. Cham: Springer, 2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95004-4

PAPINEAU, D. Reliabilism, induction and skepticism. The Philosophical Quarterly v. 42, nº 166, 1992, p.1-18. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2220445

PSILLOS, S. Scientific Realism: How science tracks truth. London: Routledge, 1999.

QUINE, W.V.O. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953.

Downloads

Published

2024-07-30

How to Cite

de Figueiredo, R. A. (2024). Substance, Inherence and Bradley’s regress. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 69(1), e44912. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.44912

Issue

Vol. 69 No. 1 (2024): Single Volume - Continuous flow

Section

Epistemology & Philosophy of Language

License

Copyright (c) 2024 Veritas (Porto Alegre)

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Copyright

The submission of originals to Revista Veritas implies the transfer by the authors of the right for publication. Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication. If the authors wish to include the same data into another publication, they must cite Revista Veritas as the site of original publication.


Creative Commons License

Except where otherwise specified, material published in this journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, which allows unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is correctly cited. Copyright: © 2006-2020 EDIPUCRS</p