Sorensen on vagueness and sorites
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2023.1.44897Keywords:
Sorensen on vagueness, Sorensen on sorites, the no-no paradox, the preface paradoxAbstract
We will try to show that Sorensen’s treatment of vagueness and sorites should not be classified as being epistemicist. Furthermore, we will try to show that the approximations that Sorensen tries to make between the soritic paradox and the no-no and preface paradoxes are not successful.
Downloads
References
BERNECKER, S. Memory: a philosophical study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.001.0001
BERNECKER, S. Remembering without knowing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, [s. l.], v. 85, n. 1, p. 137- 156, 2007. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400601176460
FERREIRA, S. S. Vagueza como arbitrariedade: esboço de uma teoria da vagueza. 2017. 166 f. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia) – Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2017.
HYDE, D. The sorites paradox. In: RONZITTI, G. (ed.). Vagueness: a guide. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer, 2011. p. 1-18. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0375-9_1
KLEIN, P. The virtues of inconsistency. The Monist, [s. l.], v. 68, n. 1, p. 105-135, 1985. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198568121
LOWE, E. J. Vagueness and metaphysics. In: RONZITTI, G. (ed.). Vagueness: a guide. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer, 2011. p. 19-53. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0375-9_2
MAKINSON, D. C. The paradox of the preface. Analysis, [S. l.], v. 25, n. 6, p. 205-207, 1965. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/25.6.205
OLIN, D. Paradox. Chesham: Acumen, 2003. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9780773583740
SORENSEN, R. Epistemic paradoxes. In: ZALTA, E. N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [S. l.], 3 mar. 2022. Disponível em: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/epistemic-paradoxes. Acesso em: 18 maio 2023.
SORENSEN, R. Vagueness and contradiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. SORENSEN, R. Dogmatism, junk knowledge, and conditionals. The Philosophical Quarterly, [s. l.], v. 38, n. 153, p. 433-454, 1988a. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2219708
SORENSEN, R. Blindspots. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988b.
VALCARENGHI, E. C. Filosofia vs. ciência: as atividades filosófica e científica em contraste (ou por que o naturalismo filosófico é uma barbárie). Belo Horizonte: Editora Dialética, 2022a. DOI: https://doi.org/10.48021/978-65-252-5996-3
VALCARENGHI, E. C. A resolução do paradoxo do teste surpresa. Aufklärung, [S. l.], v. 9, n. 1, p. 11-42, 2022b. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v9i1.61660
WILLIAMSON, T.; SIMONS, P. Vagueness and ignorance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, [s. l.], v. 66, p. 145-177, 1992. Supplementary volumes. WILLIAMSON, T. Vagueness. London and New York: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2001. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/66.1.145
WILLIAMSON, T. Wright on the epistemic conception of vagueness. Analysis, [s. l.], v. 56, n. 1, p. 39-45, 1996. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/56.1.39
WRIGHT, C. The epistemic conception of vagueness. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, [s. l.], v. XXXIII, p. 133-159, 1994. Supplement. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1995.tb00767.x
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2023 Veritas (Porto Alegre)

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.





