An experimental realism based solution for two pessimistic inductions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28684Keywords:
Pessimistic induction, Problem of unconceived alternatives, Experimental Realism, Causal realism.Abstract
In this paper, I will try to give an account of two historically informed anti-realist challenges named by Stanford (2006) as ‘old’ and ‘new pessimistic induction’, respectively. I argue that there is already an answer to both pessimistic challenges: the experimental realism originally proposed by Hacking (1983) and Cartwright (1983). According to that realism, it is possible to be committed to theoretical entities with which we develop causal interactions and produce controlled phenomena, even without extending that commitment to theories themselves. Instead of taking properly Hacking’s and Cartwright’s widely criticized arguments, I will assume a sophisticated experimental realism formulation put forward by Egg (2012).Downloads
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