Collective Epistemology: group belief, justification and knowledge
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28487Keywords:
collective epistemology, collectivism, individualism, groups, social epistemologyAbstract
In this essay we will systematize collective epistemology key concepts, presenting different views that explain our ordinary ascription of cognitive states (such as belief, justification and/or knowledge) to groups. In the introduction we raise the central question that prompts the discussion in the field: ascriptions of cognitive states to groups refers to the group itself or to the individuals who compose it? In the first section we set forth the best arguments in favor of individualism, those who argue for the thesis that our ascriptions might be reduced to individuals. In the second, third and fourth sections we present collectivist models, which claim that a group has some autonomy from individuals, the set of members who compose it. In the fifth and sixth sections we introduce how collectivist models explain the ascription of justification and knowledge to groups. We conclude by noting that collectivist attacks to individualism are very compelling, making the latter very difficult to sustain, and pointing out further elements necessary for a complete collective model.Downloads
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