Epistemological disjunctivism and radical skepticism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.27532Keywords:
epistemological disjunctivism, radical skepticism, internalism, externalism.Abstract
Epistemological disjunctivism is a philosophical theory that has received special attention in the recent years. Particularly because it has been seen by many as a way of renewing discussions that range from the nature of justification of our daily beliefs to the possibility of unveiling the structure of the problem of radical skepticism and of responding to it. Duncan Pritchard is one of the authors who have offered a particular view of disjunctivism and ways of conceiving of disjunctivist treatments to such questions. His work has as its main source of inspiration the seminal work of John McDowell. In this paper, I present a way of understanding the problem of radical skepticism and the manner in which epistemological disjunctivism aims to offer solutions to it. In order to do that, I present McDowell’s general proposal and discuss in which way his account differs from Pritchard’s own disjunctivism. At the end, I try to show how Pritchard’s approach tries to respond to radical skepticism not only by appealing to a disjunctivist reading of our epistemic position, but also by offering a revision of our structure of reasonsDownloads
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