A estrutura da autoconsciência na filosofia da mente de John Searle

Tárik de Athayde Prata

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2017.2.26467

Authors

Tárik de Athayde Prata Universidade Federal de Pernambuco http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1065-9621

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.2.26467

Keywords:

self-consciousness, introspection, explanation, unified field.

Abstract

The thesis of the paper is that Self-consciousness in Searle’s view is a (not explained) feature of the unified field of consciousness. After a discussion of three distinctions about consciousness proposed by Rosenthal (section 1), Searle’s concept of consciousness – as a qualitative, subjective and unified phenomenon – and the holistic character of this concept are discussed (section 2). Searle’s discussion of the concepts of Self-consciousness and Introspection (section 3) shows that he believes in implicit self-consciousness as a constitutive feature of the unified field of consciousness.

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Author Biography

Tárik de Athayde Prata, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

Graduado em Psicologia e Mestre em Filosofia Contemporânea pela Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC). Doutor em Filosofia pela Ruprecht-Karl Universität Heidelberg (Alemanha). Professor Adjunto do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE). Desenvolve pesquisas nas áreas de Filosofia da Mente e Filosofia da Psicologia.

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