Goodman and the Reflective Equilibrium
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2013.3.13661Keywords:
Reflective equilibrium. Justification. Nelson Goodman. Old problem of induction.Abstract
Goodman claimed that the mutual adjustment between particular inductive inferences and inductive principles composes the only justification needed for both. Nevertheless, his characterization of this adjustment, afterward named “reflective equilibrium”, was sketchy. That raised doubts about its adequacy. In this paper, I argue that the reflective equilibrium, correctly characterized, gives us the only justification needed and the best one that we can obtain for inductive practice.Downloads
References
CARVALHO, Eros. “Popper e o problema da predição prática”, Analytica, 15:2 (2011), p. 123-146.
GOODMAN, Nelson. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1983.
HAACK, Susan. “The Justification of Deduction”, Mind, 85:337 (1976), p. 112-119. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXXV.337.112
HARMAN, Gilbert; KULKARNI, Sanjeev. Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 2007. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5876.001.0001
HUME, David. Investigações sobre o entendimento humano e sobre os princípios da moral. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2004.
OWEN, David. Hume’s Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
POPPER, Karl. “O problema da indução (1974)”. In:
MILLER, David (org.). Karl Popper: textos escolhidos. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2010.
RAWLS, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1971.
SALMON, Wesley. Lógica. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1971.
STICH, Stephen; NISBETT, Richard. “Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning”, Philosophy of Science, 47:2 (1980), p. 188-202. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/288928
STRAWSON, Peter. Introduction to the Logical Theory. London: Methuen & Co., 1952.





