Risco epistêmico

Eduardo Alves; João Fett; Vinícius Felipe Posselt

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2025.1.46598

Autores

Eduardo Alves Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9075-7554
João Fett Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM), Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5585-6293
Vinícius Felipe Posselt Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2493-2094

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2025.1.46598

Palavras-chave:

Risco Epistêmico, Sorte Epistêmica, Conhecimento, Epistemologia

Resumo

Este texto é uma tradução do artigo “Epistemic Risk” (2016) de Duncan Pritchard, em que ele argumenta em favor de uma teoria modal do risco e lança as bases de uma epistemologia antirrisco. O objetivo de Pritchard nesse artigo é duplo: primeiro, ele argumenta que a sua teoria modal do risco é uma extensão natural da sua teoria modal da sorte, desenvolvida em trabalhos anteriores; segundo, ao utilizar sua teoria modal do risco para chegar a uma epistemologia antirrisco, Pritchard argumenta que essa estratégia possui vantagens para responder às preocupações levantadas à sua original teoria antissorte. A saber, uma lacuna de sua epistemologia antissorte pode ser facilmente preenchida por sua epistemologia antirrisco, e há mais motivações para adotar esta última do que a primeira.

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Biografia do Autor

Eduardo Alves, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil.

Doutorando em Filosofia na PUCRS, Porto Alegre (RS), Brasil. Bolsista do CNPq.

João Fett, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM), Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil.

Doutor em Filosofia pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre (RS), Brasil. Estagiário de Pós-Doutorado em Filosofia/professor colaborador na Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM), em Santa Maria (RS), Brasil.

Vinícius Felipe Posselt, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)

Doutorando em Filosofia na PUCRS, Brasil, financiado pelo CNPq. Pesquisador visitante na Universitat de Barcelona (UB), Espanha, financiado pela CAPES – código de financiamento 001.

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