Disjuntivismo epistemológico e ceticismo radical
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.27532Palavras-chave:
disjuntivismo epistemológico, ceticismo radical, internalismo, externalismo.Resumo
O disjuntivismo epistemológico é uma teoria filosófica que tem recebido uma atenção especial nos últimos anos. Particularmente porque ela tem sido encarada por muitos como uma via de renovação de discussões que vão desde a natureza da justificação das nossas crenças cotidianas até a possibilidade de desvendar as estruturas do ceticismo radical e responder ao problema estabelecido por ele. Duncan Pritchard é um dos autores que têm oferecido uma visão particular do disjuntivismo e maneiras de conceber tratamentos disjuntivistas para tais questões. Seu trabalho tem como fonte de inspiração, em grande medida, o trabalho seminal de John McDowell. Nesse artigo, eu apresento uma maneira de entender o problema cético radical e de que maneira o disjuntivismo epistemológico pretender oferecer soluções ao problema. Para isso, eu apresento a proposta disjuntivista geral de McDowell e discuto em que sentido essa proposta se diferencia da teoria disjuntivista defendida por Pritchard. Ao fim, eu tento mostrar como a abordagem de Pritchard pretender responder ao ceticismo radical não só apelando para uma leitura disjuntivista da nossa posição epistêmica, mas oferecendo uma revisão da nossa estrutura de razões.Downloads
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