Self-Knowledge and Epistemic Virtues: between Reliabilism and Responsibilism

César Schirmer Santos

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24287

Autores

César Schirmer Santos Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24287

Palavras-chave:

Autoconhecimento. Epistemologia das virtues. Virtudes intelectuais. Introspecção, Razão.

Resumo

O tema deste artigo é o papel do autoconhecimento na vida cognitiva de um sujeito que mereça ser considerado possuidor de conhecimento. A ideia central é que é difícil alcançar o conhecimento de si, pois a introspecção é uma fonte de crenças pouco confiável, e a razão pode ser a fonte de formas extremas de autoengano. Apesar disso, a nossa situação é tal que um agente epistêmico responsável deve buscar constantemente uma melhor compreensão dos seus próprios traços de caráter e crenças, sob o risco de pôr em perigo o seu status de sujeito possuidor de conhecimento.

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