Dogmatismo e Inferencia Ampliatival

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.42186

Palabras clave:

Inferencia ampliativa, Disyuntivismo, Dogmatismo fenomenal, Escepticismo, Transmisión

Resumen

El papel probatorio de la experiencia en la justificación de las creencias ha estado en el centro del debate de la filosofía en los últimos años. Un punto de vista es que la experiencia, o la apariencia, puede conferir una justificación inmediata (anulable) a la creencia en virtud de su fenomenología representacional. Llame a este punto de vista “dogmatismo representacional”. Otro punto de vista es que la experiencia confiere una justificación inmediata a la creencia en virtud de su fenomenología relacional. Llame a este punto de vista “dogmatismo relacional”. El objetivo de este artículo es contrastar estas versiones del dogmatismo en términos de su capacidad para dar cuenta de la justificación inferencial ampliativa o no deductiva. Argumentaré que solo la concepción representacional puede proporcionar una explicación plausible de este tipo de justificación.

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Biografía del autor/a

Berit Brogaard, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA.

Professor and Cooper Fellow, University of Miami.

Citas

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Publicado

2021-12-27

Cómo citar

Brogaard, B. (2021). Dogmatismo e Inferencia Ampliatival. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 66(1), e42186. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.42186

Número

Vol. 66 Núm. 1 (2021): Volumen único

Sección

Epistemologia & Filosofia da Linguagem

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Derechos de autor 2021 Veritas (Porto Alegre)

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