Lo que hacemos y presuponemos cuando demostramos
De la semántica a la meta-pragmática
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2020.3.38525Palabras clave:
Demostrativos, Saliencia, Atención conjunta, Presuposición, MetapragmáticaResumen
En este artículo, defendemos que demostrativos son expresiones de atención conjunta. Aunque dicha idea no sea precisamente novedosa en la literatura filosófica o lingüística, sostendremos aquí que sus defensores todavía no nos han mostrado como incluir esa observación en las teorías más tradicionales de demostrativos. Nuestro propósito por lo tanto es llenar ese vacío. Argumentaremos que actividades de atención coordinada deben ser incorporadas a una teoría de demostrativos cómo información metapragmática. Defenderemos dos puntos. Primero que presuponer pragmáticamente la saliencia del referente es un aspecto fundamental del uso de demostrativos (algo previsto por su semántica y por su metasemántica). Segundo, sostendremos que la pragmática de demostrar solo puede ser entendida adecuadamente en su relación con las condiciones metapragmáticas provenientes de la atención conjunta. Usaremos intuiciones de ‘gaps’ de valor de verdad como evidencia para tal afirmación. Creemos que nuestra propuesta ofrece una visión completa de lo que los hablantes hacen y presuponen cuando realizan actos de referencia demostrativa a través del lenguaje.Descargas
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