Did John Rawls Refute Intuitionism?

Abstract

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls explained intuitionism as the doctrine that professes the irreducible pluralism of moral principles—principles whose conflicts cannot be resolved in a principled way. According to Rawls, one cannot offer an abstract argument that proves moral pluralism false. However, it is possible to demonstrate what the intuitionist denies exists: the most fundamental moral principle that systematizes our moral obligations. Rawls identifies this principle as the principle of fairness. In this article, I argue that Rawls falls short in addressing intuitionists. My arguments rely on an analysis of the applicability of the principle of fairness to the case of promises. First, I contend that the principle of fairness could only explain moral obligations in general if it could incorporate within its formula a paradigmatic case of the obligations it aims to explain—specifically, promissory obligations. Subsequently, I attempt to show that these promissory obligations possess an essential trait that the principle of fairness would not be able to explain, even if it could account for moral obligations in general: the distinctive nature of the obligations as special obligations to the promisees. In the first point, my research expands on Robert Nozick's criticisms of a version of the principle of fairness presented by H.L.A. Hart. In the second, I develop objections made by Stephen Darwall against the practical theory of promises, including John Rawls's theory.