Notes for an up-to-date assessment of the computational approach to mind
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.44571Keywords:
Mental representations, Connectionism, Structural computationalism, MechanicismAbstract
The paper proposes an up-to-date assessment of the computational approach to mind, detailing conceptual and critical aspects. The assessment is guided by three theses α) The human mind is a computational system; β) The human mind can be described as a computational system; γ) Computational systems need representational content, from which it is shown that classical computationalism is articulated in terms of α∧γ and that contemporary strands are best understood in terms of α∧~γ or β∧~γ. Finally, after analyzing a series of objections, we argue that 21st century computationalism is a philosophically relevant research program and that the critics of the computational approach to mind incur an anachronism when they merely criticize classical strands.
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