Nietzsche and Prinz

A compatibilist hypothesis of cognitive and non-cognitive approaches in the philosophy of emotions

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2023.1.43798

Keywords:

emotion, feeling, evaluation, disposition, Nietzsche, Prinz

Abstract

The purpose of the text is not only to explain the contribution of Nietzsche’s philosophy to the current debate around the philosophy of emotions, through a theoretical approach to Jesse Prinz’s emotionism – especially the approach of emotions understood as feeling –, but above all to defend the thesis of the compatibility of the cognitive and non-cognitive approach to emotions. Thus, if on the one hand, emotions are accompanied by somatic signals, on the other hand, emotions also represent concerns (Prinz) or evaluations (Nietzsche) about something in the world. The compatibilist thesis helps in solving two serious objections to sentimentalism: the determination of the content of emotions and the individualization of emotional experiences. Maybe this thesis is best understood, furthermore, through the dispositional hypothesis.

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Author Biographies

Jorge Luiz Viesenteiner, Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo (UFES), Vitória, ES, Brasil.

Doutor em filosofia pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Unicamp), em Campinas, SP, Brasil; com pós-doutorado na Radboud University Nijmegen, na Holanda e na Universität Stuttgart, na Alemanha. Professor do Departamento e da Pós-graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo (UFES), em Vitória, ES, Brasil.

Vinícius F. Apolinário, Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo (UFES), Vitória, ES, Brasil.

Mestre em Filosofia pelo Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, (UFES), em Vitória, ES, Brasil.

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Published

2023-04-12

How to Cite

Viesenteiner, J. L., & F. Apolinário, V. (2023). Nietzsche and Prinz: A compatibilist hypothesis of cognitive and non-cognitive approaches in the philosophy of emotions. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 68(1), e43798. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2023.1.43798

Issue

Section

Epistemology & Philosophy of Language