Do the referents of proper names have essential sortal properties?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2022.1.40327Keywords:
Proper Names, Sortal Essentialism, Direct Reference, Producers, MetonymyAbstract
According to the default view, the direct reference theory and essentialism are independent. Jubien (2009), however, claims that we apply proper names to objects with essential sortal properties (which he calls “categories”) and cease to apply them if the objects lose these properties. The objective of this paper is to defend this thesis. First, I will argue that proper names are usually used to refer to objects which possess socially relevant kinds of sortal properties. The linguistic community determines the relevant sortal property of the referent through the division of linguistic labor. Then, I will present a defense against the objections of plausible counterexamples in two steps. First, showing that in many cases the change of sortal property is only apparent. Secondly, I will describe the mechanism of metonymy, which explains why we use homonymous names for different, however, contiguous objects. Finally, I will employ a modification of Putnam’s Principle of the Benefit of the Doubt to deal with the problem of radical error, i.e., cases in which the linguistic community is entirely deceived concerning the sortal property of the referent. The results cast a deeper light on the conceptual scheme underlying our ordinary language naming practices.
Downloads
References
CHATEAUBRIAND, Oswaldo. Logical Forms Part I: truth and description. Campinas: UNICAMP: Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência, 2001.
DEVITT, Michael. Designation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7312/devi90836
EVANS, Gareth. The Casual Theory of Names. In: EVANS, Gareth. Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. p. 1-25.
EVANS, Gareth. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
FREGE, Gottlob. Über Sinn und Bedeutung. In: PATZIG, G. (ed.). Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung. Fünf Logische Studien. 7. ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007. p. 40-65.
GRANDY, Richard; FREUD, Max. Sortals. In: ZALTA, E. N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [S. l.]: Stanford University, Winter 2020. Disponível em: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/sortals. Acesso em: 21 fev. 2021.
IMAGUIRE, Guido. De dicto, de Re et de Proprietatibus rerum. Analytica, Rio de Janeiro, v. 16, n. 1-2, p. 166-180, 2012.
JUBIEN, Michael. Possibility. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199232789.001.0001
KANT, I. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Editado por J. Timmermann. Hamburg: Meiner, 1998. DOI: https://doi.org/10.28937/978-3-7873-2112-4
KAPLAN, David. Demonstratives. In: ALMONG, J.; PERRY, J.; WETTSTEIN, H. (ed.). Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989a. p. 481-564.
KAPLAN, David. Afterthoughts. In: ALMONG, J.; PERRY, J.; WETTSTN, H. (ed.). Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989b. p. 565-614.
KORMAN, Daniel, Z. Ordinary Objects. In: ZALTA, E. N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [S. l.]: Stanford University, Fall Edition 2020. Disponível em: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/ordinary-objects. Acesso em: 20 fev. 2021.
KRIPKE, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9
KRIPKE, Saul. Identity and Necessity. In: MUNITZ, M. K. (ed.). Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press, 1971. p. 135-164.
LAPORTE, Joseph. Rigid Designators. In: ZALTA, E., N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [S. l.]: Stanford University, Spring 2018. Disponível em: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/rigid-designators. Acesso em: 3 dez. 2020.
MARTI, Genoveva. The question of rigidity in new theories of reference. Nous, [S. l.], v. 37, p.161-179, 2003. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2982.2005.00688.x-i1
MICHAELSON, Eliot; REIMER, Marga. Reference. In: ZALTA, E., N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [S. l.]: Stanford University, Spring 2019. Disponível em: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/reference. Acesso em: 27 out. 2020.
MOTLOCH, Martin. Essência. In: BRANQUINHO, J.; SANTOS, R. (ed.) Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica. Lisboa: Alameda da Universidade, [2014]. Disponível em: http://compendioemlinha.letras.ulisboa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/motloch_2014_essencia.pdf. Acesso em: 14 fev. 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.51427/cfi.2021.0027
PASSINGHAM, Richard. Cognitive Neuroscience: a very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198786221.001.0001
PUTNAM, Hilary. Mind, Language and Reality: philosophical papers. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1975a. v. 2. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625251
PUTNAM, Hilary. The Meaning of ‘Meaning. In: PUTNAM, Hilary. Mind, Language and Reality: philosophical papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975b. v. 2, p. 215-271. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625251.014
PUTNAM, Hilary. Language and Reality. In: PUTNAM, Hilary. Mind, Language and Reality: philosophical papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975c. v. 2, p. 272-290. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625251.015
QUINE, W.V. Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960.
WIGGINS, D. Sameness and Substance renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612756
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. Philosophische Untersuchungen. Editado por Joachim Schulte. Frankfurt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001.
ZIFF, Paul. Semantic analysis. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1960.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2022 Veritas (Porto Alegre)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright
The submission of originals to Revista Veritas implies the transfer by the authors of the right for publication. Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication. If the authors wish to include the same data into another publication, they must cite Revista Veritas as the site of original publication.
Creative Commons License
Except where otherwise specified, material published in this journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, which allows unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is correctly cited. Copyright: © 2006-2020 EDIPUCRS</p
