Verificationism, Expressivism, Inferentialism
A normative reading
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2020.3.38430Keywords:
Middle Wittgenstein, Verificationism, Expressivism, Inferentialism, NormativityAbstract
This paper applies some topics found in Brandom’s semantic inferentialism to illuminate Middle Wittgenstein’s verificationism, such as the expressivist role of negation, the semantic holism presented in inferentialist accounts and the non-reducibility of conceptual relations of incompatibilities in terms of purely formal relations. For that, it defends a normative reading concerning the color exclusion problem and its impact on the tractarian notation as a motivation for verificationism and its connections with inferentialism and expressivism. It is shown, then, that the expressive power of truth table-notation can be enhanced through some systematic mutilations of its lines
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