Elucidating the Conceivability Argument
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.37961Keywords:
Conceivability, Phenomenal consciousness, Two-dimensional semanticsAbstract
It shall be examined how anti-physicalist arguments give rise to the tension between those aspects of our everyday life (with focus on phenomenality) and the thesis of physicalism. The debate over the subjective character of consciousness, or as it is sometimes called: “the hard problem of consciousness” (CHALMERS, 1996), is considered to be the greatest challenge to physicalism. Many philosophers posit this as a matter that cannot be solved, regardless of scientific progress, for it is beyond the scope of what science can find out about the world. If they are correct, the consequence is that the idea of physicalism itself fails. The paper is divided in two parts. For the first part we will deal with Chalmers’ version of the conceivability argument as well as the semantic apparatus of the two-dimensional framework required to make the appropriate link between conceivability and possibility. At the end of this we shall take a look at Kripke’s version of the conceivability argument against physicalism.
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