An experimental realism based solution for two pessimistic inductions

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28684

Keywords:

Pessimistic induction, Problem of unconceived alternatives, Experimental Realism, Causal realism.

Abstract

In this paper, I will try to give an account of two historically informed anti-realist challenges named by Stanford (2006) as ‘old’ and ‘new pessimistic induction’, respectively. I argue that there is already an answer to both pessimistic challenges: the experimental realism originally proposed by Hacking (1983) and Cartwright (1983). According to that realism, it is possible to be committed to theoretical entities with which we develop causal interactions and produce controlled phenomena, even without extending that commitment to theories themselves. Instead of taking properly Hacking’s and Cartwright’s widely criticized arguments, I will assume a sophisticated experimental realism formulation put forward by Egg (2012).

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Author Biography

Tiago Luís Teixeira Oliveira, Colégio Pedro II

Bacharel Licenciado em Filosofia pela PUC-MG, Mestre em Filosofia pela UFMG, Doutor em Filosofia pela UFMG. Professor do Departamento de Filosofia do Colégio Pedro II (RJ)

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Published

2017-12-28

How to Cite

Oliveira, T. L. T. (2017). An experimental realism based solution for two pessimistic inductions. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 62(3), 595–623. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28684