Três barreiras para o progresso filosófico

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2019.1.32707

Palavras-chave:

metafilosofia, preconceito, progresso

Resumo

Neste artigo Jessica Wilson identifica dimensões pelas quais pode haver progresso filosófico e destaca o problema da falta de padrões partilhados por filósofas e filósofos, padrões que permitam avaliar teses filosóficas. Wilson argumenta que esse problema coloca três barreiras para o progresso filosófico: gera enclausuramento intradisciplinar; abre espaço para que fatores sociológicos sejam determinantes (na questão de quais teses filosóficas devem ser consideradas ou avaliadas) e encoraja vieses. Por fim, Wilson apresenta algumas sugestões acerca de como lidar com essas barreiras.

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Referências

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Publicado

2019-07-11

Como Citar

Gaboardi, G. (2019). Três barreiras para o progresso filosófico. Intuitio, 12(1), e32707. https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2019.1.32707

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v. 12 n. 1 (2019): Metafísica e Epistemologia

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